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abstract
Tension has been the most significant and constant 
factor in the relationship between North and South 
Korea over the past sixty years. The differences in the 
political systems and the economic disparity between 
the two countries have resulted in what was once one 
nation moving in two radically divergent directions. 
These differences have led to a state of imbalance and 
resulted in constant political instability that has been 
playing out within the boundaries of the two countries, 
explicitly in no-man’s land, the demilitarized zone 
(DMZ). 
v
As one of the world’s most heavily militarized border-
line, the DMZ embodies a wide range of political and 
social tensions. Among these is the action-reaction 
relationship between the Imnam Dam of North Korea 
and the Peace Dam of South Korea; the Imnam Dam 
was built as an act of offence to flood Seoul by bomb-
ing the dam down, and the Peace Dam was built as an 
act of defence to prevent overflow of water into Seoul. 
The historical and present conditions of this relationship 
maximize the military limitations and the possibilities of 
greater exchange between the two Koreas in creating a 
mutually beneficial relationship. In this thesis, this rela-
tionship is realized through “faction space”, a specific 
space situated in a fictional reality that does not reflect 
on its immediate surroundings, but of its own world, a 
speculative fictional idea of what it could become. Four 
different types of borderline conditions are studied to 
find out how these conditions can be translated into 
opportunities of creating spaces not only for the mili-
tary, but also for the public. Each condition focuses on 
a topic derived from the existing surroundings. The final 
faction spaces perform as architectural stimuli within 
the feuding landscape of the two Koreas, striving to re-
lieve or intensify the social and political tension between 
each other, while offering mutual benefits at the same 
time. Conditions of these faction spaces may begin to 
exist in various places around the DMZ, redefining the 
borderscape. A time may come when the most heavily 
militarized zone in the world shifts its focus to become a 
space for reciprocity.
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Full of unbearable memories and traces of war, 248km of cold 
wire fence is embedded into the ground exposing the tension 
between the two countries, North and South Korea. This fence 
is the physical representation of the DMZ, a demilitarized zone 
between North and South Korea. Just like the rust on the decaying 
fences, the political tension between the two Koreas has lasted 
for the sixty years while being in an armistice state. During the 
years, many political and economic deals have worked out across 
the DMZ despite this tension, which sometimes has eased and 
sometimes heightened. Recently, this tension reached its highest 
point when the North’s leader Kim Jong Il died in December 2011, 
resulting a sense of instability not seen since the death of Kim 
Il Sung in 1994. Over the past year, numerous instances proving 
this instability have occurred, including the ones where two North 
Korean soldiers defected to South Korea, only four days apart from 
each other. According to the South Korean government officials, 
it is speculated that the reason behind these actions are because 
of the abolition of the food distribution system in the army.1 The 
imbalance between the two Koreas is getting steeper and steeper.
 
Bae, Yoon Kyeong. MK News.1
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This thesis explores the concept of creating a counteraction to the 
imbalance between the two countries by proposing ways of mutual 
benefits to both countries, politically, economically, and socially. 
This is achieved through the ideas of faction space: a fictional 
reality within the factual circumstances of the present condition 
of the DMZ. Faction space requires a state of exception for it to 
be realized. An Italian political philosopher Giorgio Agamben refers 
the state of exception as a paradigm of government, “a technique 
of government rather than an exceptional measure,” and that it 
“lets its own nature as the constitutive paradigm of the juridical 
order come to light.”2 He also mentions how Clinton L. Rossiter 
“is aware that constitutional dictatorship (that is, the state of 
exception)... is fraught with dangers”.3 As a policy that occurs to 
temporarily avoid the situation during a state of emergency or to 
counteract the existing legal conditions, state of exception exists 
beyond the norm. In this thesis, the state of exception is redefined 
as an opportunity rather than danger. In the context of the two 
Koreas, the state of exception generates opportunities for various 
relationships between North and South Korea, and develops into 
a spatial condition— faction space. Spatially, the characteristic 
of faction space is similar to how Michael Foucault defines 
heterotopia as a place “outside of all places, even though it may 
be possible to indicate their location in reality."4 The difference 
between the two is that “there is probably not a single culture in 
the world that fails to constitute heterotopias”,5 while faction space 
is constituted only at specific moments to embody the physical 
need of a state of exception. Being a spatial resultant of the state 
of exception, faction space is also not a norm by nature, but it 
can evolve to become a norm in the future. Some examples around 
the world are the tunnels crossing under the US Mexican border, 
the indefinite presence of Palestine as a nation and territory, and 
the city of Berlin within the territory of East Germany following 
the WWII; detailed examples of already existing mutually beneficial 
relationships between the two Koreas are discussed later in the 
thesis. Then, there will be a discussion of how these opportunities 
of mutual benefits are translated to become an alternate way of 
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[ the beginning ]
When Japan surrendered to the western Allied forces in 1945, 
it was also the end of the thirty-five years of ruling Korea. As 
a result, an escalation of tension occurred between the two 
countries, the USA and the USSR, which sponsored the two 
Koreas. This history itself illustrates the concept of “faction,” 
an unusual condition where the contents of the situation 
does not relate to the immediate context of the surrounding 
environment. Due to its nature of being “fiction” plus fact, 
factions are not so permanent; a story can always be rewritten. 
In this part of history, the environment was Korea, the Korean 
people, and the Korean culture; yet, the actual contents within 
them were purely Japanese enforcements, or those from the 
USA or the USSR after being released from Japan.  After a 
number of uprisings and protests, the Republic of Korea (ROK) 
was established through the election of a president on August 
15th, 1948; North Korea followed shortly after on August 25th, 
1948 to form the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) 
through parliamentary elections. The creation of two countries 
intensified the tension even more, and finally on June 25th of 
1950, the Korean War began. The war first broke out due to 
North Korea’s invasion to the South because of Kim Il Sung’s 
confidence in achieving victory. At the time, the North was 
better resourced; however, their tactics failed, and the war 
ended without any gain in territory at the 38th parallel on July 
27th, 1953. The Armistice Agreement was signed on this day and 
the DMZ line was established.6 The two countries have been 
operating as separate sovereign states under the name the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), informally North 
Korea, and the Republic of Korea (ROK), informally South Korea. 
Under two very different governments, they have developed 
into distinct two countries, but the Korean people still call 
themselves as a “divided country.”
This part of Korean history is well 
known to all Koreans from their 
elementary years. Details can be 
found on HISTORYNET by the Na-






1910-1945             : japanese ruling era
august 15, 1945   : japanese surrender
1945-1948         : unified korean government
july-aug. 1948   : separation into two | communism vs. capitalism
june 25, 1950         : north invades south | korean war begins
september 1950     : battle of incheon | UN forces help south
october 1950  : china intervenes | china helps north
july 27, 1953 : armistice | creation of DMZ
fig. 1.1 korean history
Brief timeline of the Korean War 
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fig. 1.2 during Korean War
This anti-Communist North Korean just released from a prisoner of war camp is serv-
ing as a kind of cheerleader for fellow ex-POW’s as they shout their joy of reaching 
Seoul. The flags are of the Republic of South Korea. Ca. 1953-54. Gravy. (USIA)
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fig. 1.3 during Korean War
With her brother on her back a war weary Korean girl tiredly trudges by a 
stalled tank, at Haengju, Korea. June 9, 1951. Maj. R.V. Spencer, UAF. (Navy)
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Establishing the DMZ buffer territory was the end of the Korean 
War, but it was also the beginning of the never-ending tug of war 
between the two countries. During the 1950s and 1960s, both North 
and South Korea were busy taking care of their own countries on 
their parts of the peninsula; they were finding ways to support and 
develop themselves without much external help from sponsor coun-
tries. Strengthening military forces was the top priority for both the 
North and the South in order to defend themselves not only from 
external forces, but from each other as well. Nevertheless, publicly, 
neither of the countries appeared to be interested in starting a 
war. One idea that Kim Il Sung and Park Jeong Hee had in com-
mon was to free Korea from the influence of external powers: the 
United States, the Soviet Union, China, and Japan.7 This agreement 
is illustrated through the conversation between Kim Il Sung and Lee 
Hu Rak, director of the ROK intelligence agency, during a secret 
meeting on May 4, 1972 and, then again, through the official joint 




LEE: President Park Jeong Hee and I believe uni-
fication should be achieved by ourselves without 
interference of the four powers [the United States, 
China, Japan, the Soviet Union]…. We are never 
front men of the United States or Japan. We believe 
we should resolve our issues by ourselves….
KIM: Our position is to oppose reliance on external 
forces on the issue of unification. This is where I 
agree with Park Jeong Hee….
LEE: I’d like to tell you that President Park is a per-
son who detests foreign interference most.
KIM: That being so, we are already making progress 
to solve the issue. Let us exclude foreign forces. 
Let’s not fight. Let’s unite as a nation. Let’s not take 
issue with communism or capitalism….
LEE: A nation with 40-50 million people is a powerful 
country. [The population of the South in 1972 was 32 
million; that of the North 14 million.] One hundred 
years ago we yielded to big powwers because we 
were weak. In the future the big powers will yield to 
us. I’d like to make it clear to you, the big powers 
only provide lip service to our hope for unification. 
But in their hearts, they don’t want our unification.
KIM: Big powers and imperialism prefer to divide a 
nation into several nations. 
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A few months after the secret meeting, the two leaders came to an 
agreement about the methods to unify the two countries. They are 
as follows:
First, unification shall be achieved through independ-
ent efforts without being subject to external imposition or 
interference.
Second, unification shall be achieved through peaceful 
means, and not through use of force against one another.
Third, a great national unity, as a homogeneous people, shall 
be sought first, transcending differences in ideas, ideologies, 
and systems.8
This agreement seemed to be a significant step for both North and 
South Korea. Since the joint statement, both countries have worked 
hard to enhance their international reputation. The first visit by 
North Koreans to the South was made two months after the state-
ment was issued, and then, several more followed over the years. 
These exchanges of ideas and interests were made in the hope that 
the external forces would remove themselves from Korea. However, 
North Korea began to lose interest in maintaining the relationship 
with South Korea because it was becoming evident that this inter-
Korean relationship was not leading to the withdrawal of the US 
military. Then, the trouble deepened. On August 15, 1974, President 
Park Jeong Hee was making his speech at the National Theater in 
Seoul when an assassin attempted to shoot him. Instead, the First 
Lady fell to the floor and died within hours from a bullet wound to 
the head.9 This was a second assassination attempt by North Korea 
after the one in 1968. This time, the assassin was a 22-year-old 
Korean citizen born and raised in Japan, who confessed that an 
official of a North Korean residents association had recruited him 
and trained him to carry out the assassination. Although this inci-
dent was presented mostly as a Korea-Japan conflict, deep inside 
it was between North and South Korea as it was the North Koreans 
who wrote the assassination plot.10 The declaration of the joint 
statement itself may be seen as a faction from the beginning; both 
sides were writing a story of its own, creating their own bounda-
ries, aside from what is seen on the outside. Standing on the 









As the relationship between the two Koreas began to weaken 
“above ground,” a silent war was developing “underground.” On 
November 15, 1974, only three months after the assassination 
attempt on President Park, a South Korean army squad discovered 
steam rising from the ground only one kilometer from the south-
ern DMZ line. A soldier poked his bayonet into the ground, and at 
about only 46 centimeters, he hit the top of a reinforced tunnel.11
 
The discovery was extraordinary; they found an underground 
tunnel. The tunnel still exists, and is 1.2m high, 0.9m wide, and 
3,500m long; its walls are made of reinforced concrete; it has 
complete electric lines and lighting; there are side areas for 
sleeping and storage, and a narrow-gauge railway is in place. It 
was calculated that, about two thousand soldiers could standby 
inside this tunnel for initial attack, and then additional soldiers 
transported at a rate of five to seven hundred men per hour. 
The second tunnel was discovered in March 1975. About 0.8km 
away from the southern DMZ line, the tunnel was found by lower-
ing a special camera into a borehole at a suspected site, after 
researching and closely examining the ground conditions of the 
DMZ. This tunnel is 2.0m high, 2.0m wide, and 3,500m long, and is 
constructed through solid granite more than 45m below ground. It 
was estimated that, initially, about eight thousand soldiers could 
standby inside this tunnel for initial attack, and then additional 
soldiers at a rate of three thousand men per hour, including light 
artillery and other weapons. The third tunnel was discovered in 
October 1978, followed by the fourth tunnel in May 1989. Both 
tunnels are similar in size to the second tunnel; the first is 2.0m 
high, 2.0m wide, and 1,635m long; the latter is 1.7m high, 1.7m 
wide, and about 2,052m long. It was estimated that approximately 
thirty thousand soldiers per hour, including artillery, could be 
transported through the tunnels.12
 
The South Korean and the US Armies had no choice but to 
respond to this underground threat. A total of 245 seismic listen-
ing and analysing devices were placed along the DMZ area in 
order to find more tunnels. While looking at the complex geology 
spreading across the 248km of the DMZ, an American physicist 
remarked that this effort was “worse than looking for a needle in 
a haystack; more like looking for a vacuum in space.”13 Estimates 
have been made that there are twenty-two tunnels within the DMZ 
area, but no more have been discovered to date.
Oberdorfer, 56.
Multiple resources can be found 
regarding the information on the 
infiltration tunnels. 
“DMZ - DPRK Tunnels.” , accessed 

































































속전속결전법을 도입하여 기습전을 감행할 수 있게 하라.
Carry out a suprise attack by introducing blitz tactics.
Kim Il Seong, 25th of September, 1971{ }
fig. 1.4 North Korean Infiltration Tunnel (opposite top)
US Army photos by Edward N. Johnson
fig. 1.5 North Korean Infiltration Tunnels (opposite bottom)
Tunnel #1 to #4
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 [ the dams ]
Along with the discoveries of the tunnels, there were other 
factional incidents near the DMZ borders that contributed to 
intensifying the tension between North and South Korea. Known 
as the “Axe Murder Incident,” two US soldiers were killed by 
North Korean officers on the morning of August 18, 1976. These 
two men were cutting down a poplar tree that was obstructing 
the view towards the North from two nearby guard posts at the 
Joint Security Area (JSA). Just as the work got underway, two 
North Korean officers and nine enlisted men appeared in a truck, 
demanding the work to stop. As the US soldiers continued their 
work, the North Korean soldiers began to attack them, eventually 
killing them with an axe at site. Nine other US and Korean soldiers 
were also injured during the fight.14 JSA is an area where both 
sides have agreed to have no heavy artilleries to avoid conflict 
leading to direct combat, because the soldiers literally face each 
other with only a six-inch wide step between them. A direct 
murder incident in this area can be seen as a factional situation 
because of its unexpectedness; North Koreans created their own 
imaginary boundary with their own rules, out of the norm, during 
the moment of the murder. 
Ten years later, the North initiates another faction around the 
DMZ area. On April 1986, North Korea announced the construc-
tion plan for the Imnam Dam (also called Mt.Geumgang Dam in 
South Korea), a hydroelectric dam located on the mouth of the 
Bukhan River. The “official” purpose of this construction was 
the preservation of water resources; however, South Korea saw 
it differently. War scenarios were written. The Bukhan River is a 
tributary of the Han River, the river that flows through the center 
of Seoul. If North Korea were to ever bomb the Imnam Dam, it 
would release great amounts of water that could flood the entire 
city of Seoul. The South Korean government did not stay silent. 
The following November, the government began to inform the 
citizens about the great threat of the Imnam Dam to the capital 
city: “Holding over 200 billion tons of water, North Korea will be 
able to submerge Seoul fifty meters deep.”15 Although the infor-
mation was exaggerated, nobody questioned it; everyone lived 
in fear. Donations were collected nationwide to support build-
ing a responsive dam downstream. Construction began the next 
Oberdorfer, 74-75.





year, and the first phase of the Peace Dam, 85 meters high, was 
finished in 1989. However, the construction did not continue once 
it became public that the information about the Imnam Dam had 
been exaggerated. After the first phase, the water capacity of the 
Peace Dam was only 590 million tons, significantly less than the 
water capacity of the Imnam Dam, which is 2.62 billion tons. Then, 
construction resumed again in 2002 as reports appeared about the 
instability of the structure of the Imnam Dam; provisions had to 
be made for the possibility of massive flooding due to the collapse 
of the Imnam Dam. After the second phase, the Peace Dam was 
125 meters high, with a water capacity of 2.63 billion tons.16 It 
seems ironic that the Peace Dam has no other function than flood 
control, where as the Imnam Dam was constructed to produce 
hydroelectric power; the Peace Dam can be represented merely as 
a defensive mechanism to control flooding. Nevertheless, the dam 
proved itself as a useful flood control dam during the localized 
torrential downpours in 1995 and 1996, as well as in September 
2005, when North Korea released waters from the Imnam Dam 
without any forewarning.
[the aid]
With respect to the greater whole, the tension between the two 
countries began to ease as the then South Korean president Kim 
Dae Joong introduced the “Sunshine Policy” in 1998.17 The term 
is derived from Aesop’s Fables  – The Wind and the Sun; it is not 
the strong wind that makes the man take off his coat, but the 
warmth of the sun that shines above him. Kim’s policy referred to 
presenting an appeasement policy where the South Korean gov-
ernment would help North Korea move towards reformation and 
an open economy. After the policy took affect, there has been a 
significant change in the amount of aid South Korea sent to North 
Korea. In 1998, the total amount of humanitarian aid was 42.9 bil-
lion won (approximately 38 million dollars), and then after just two 
years, it was 242.2 billion won (approximately 214 million dollars). 
The amount increased slowly over the years, increasing to 439.7 
billion won (approximately 388 million dollars) in 2007; however, 
it was cut to one-quarter of the amount the next year when the 
present president Lee Myeong Bak was elected.18 He did not 
agree with the sunshine policy and slowly began to take a tougher 
stance against North Korea.
Naver Encyclopedia
There has been many debates 
regarding the positive and nega-
tive effects of the Sunshine Policy 
by Kim. Detailed analysis of these 
effects can be found in: 
Kim, Mi-Duck. “A Study on the 
Sushine Policy of Kim Dae-Jung 
Government.”
Detailed data available at the 
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fig. 1.6 Predicted Flood Level of Seoul, 1986
Closeup of an illustration demonstrating the level of flood in Seoul if the Mt.Geumgang Dam was bombed.
Excerpted from article dated November 6, 1986.
The Kyunghyang Sinmun
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fig. 1.7 The Threat of 200t Dam, 1986
Article covering the “threat” of 20 billion ton of water that Mt.Geumgang Dam holds upstream in North Korea. 
(center diagram) Illustration of dams along the Bukhan River from Mt.Geumgang Dam (right) to Seoul (left).
November 5, 1986. 
The Kyunghyang Sinmun
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[ the shift ]
March 26, 2010.
On this date, the relationship between North and South Korea 
shifted entirely in a new direction; a South Korean warship, 
Cheonan, was sunk by a North Korean torpedo in contested 
waters in the Yellow Sea. The loss of the ship and forty-six sailors 
increased the tension between the two Koreas significantly. This 
act of aggression marked the end of the so-called “sunshine 
policy” that former President Kim Dae Joong established. “We 
have always tolerated North Korea’s brutality, time and again, … 
. We did so because we have always had a genuine longing for 
peace on the Korean Peninsula. But now things are different.”19 
President Lee Myung Bak made this announcement right after 
the incident, and he suspended all trade, as well as aid for food 
and daily necessities. North Korea denied any responsibility for 
the sinking and threatened South Korea that they would back out 
of the nonaggression pact.20 Then, on November 23, 2010, North 
Korea shelled Yeon-pyeong Island in reaction to the annual joint 
operation by the Allied land, sea, and air forces of South Korean 
and the US Army. Two soldiers and two citizens lost their lives, 
and nineteen people were seriously injured. Various theories about 
the North Korea attack existed, but the most convincing was that 
it was due to the instability of Kim Jeong Eun at that time. As the 
successor to Kim Jeong Il, Kim Jeong Eun had to demonstrate that 
he too had the power to command the military. However, Andrei 
Lankov, an expert on North Korea, argues that the attack was a 
way of sending a message: “We are here, we are crazy, we are 
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Labor force Budget Exports Imports Mobile cell phone Broadcast media Airports Railways Roadways Waterways
NORTH KOREA
RATIO (South : North) 1.99 : 1 1.15 : 1 36.48 : 1 6.78 : 1 16.67 : 1 2.03 : 1 73.47 : 1 232.5 : 1 136.43 : 1 117.54 : 1 - 1.47 : 1 0.64 : 1 4.03 : 1 0.71 : 1
Table 1.1 Economy Comparison between North and South Korea
CNN Wire Staff. “South Korea 
Suspends Trade with N.Korea.” 
CNN.com.
CNN Wire Staff. “North Korea Re-
jects Torpedo Findings, Threatens 
War.” CNN.com.
Andrei Lankov first went to North 
Korea back in September 1984, as 
a participant in an exchange pro-
gram between the then-USSR and 
North Korea; he became intrigued 
with the country. He is currently a 
professor at Kookmin University in 
Seoul, South Korea.
Salmon, Andrew. “Theories Abound 






The so-called “overdue paycheck” that North Korea is still 
demanding is not an obligation that South Korea has to fulfill; the 
previous aid was sent either through mutual agreement between 
the two governments or through the generosity of humanitar-
ian organizations. It was always a one-way relationship. Over the 
years, North Korea experienced economic isolation from the rest 
of the world, and the rigidity of the totalitarian state suppressed 
active economic development and prosperity of the country. As 
seen in Table 1, the contrast in the economies of the two is very 
clear. The current statistics indicate that the ratio of the differ-
ences in the economic level of South Korea and North Korea is 
384:1.22 Also, social interaction, such as mobile communication 
and broadcasting, in South Korea is much more active than in 
North Korea. These differences can be derived from the commu-
nication levels of the two countries; communication is the main 
element in social interaction. Depending on the government state, 
focus areas of development are different; one may be focused on 
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Labor force Budget Exports Imports Mobile cell phone Broadcast media Airports Railways Roadways Waterways
NORTH KOREA
RATIO (South : North) 1.99 : 1 1.15 : 1 36.48 : 1 6.78 : 1 16.67 : 1 2.03 : 1 73.47 : 1 232.5 : 1 136.43 : 1 117.54 : 1 - 1.47 : 1 0.64 : 1 4.03 : 1 0.71 : 1
Data retrieved from 
The World Factbook 2009.
22
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[ the imbalance ]
This limitation and growth keep the two Koreas different from each 
other, and hold them back from easily collaborating with each 
other. Nevertheless, certain projects that North and South Korea 
have agreed to undertake exist in North Korea; these projects have 
existed and more can exist in form of what I call “faction space”.23   
Coming out from the initial concept of “faction,” faction space 
refers to a specific space situated in reality that does not reflect on 
its immediate surroundings, but of its own world. In other words, 
the purpose of the space is not derived from the site context, but 
of the creator’s specific intentions and reasons, regardless of what 
is and can be situated at the site. Firstly, exploring the concept of 
“state of exception” will help to understand how faction space can 
be achieved.
 
A state of exception exists where there is an imbalance between two 
immediate environments, and then it is transformed into a norm. To 
create a state of exception, necessity to counteract the imbalance 
is required. For instance, strict security measures were enforced 
around all the airports in the US after the 9/11 incident; this was a 
reaction to the state of emergency caused by terrorist attacks in 
the country. Good-byes had to be made in front of check-in kiosks 
instead of at the gate, people now had to go through extensive 
security checks before boarding, and, even a very minor action 
that seems suspicious could result in immediate custody. It was a 
major change in a short period of time. Now, nobody questions the 
procedures — it is a norm.
 
On his essay, “The State of Exception as a Paradigm of Govern-
ment”, Giorgio Agamben, an Italian political philosopher, defines 
that state of exception is “not a special kind of law (like the law of 
war); rather, insofar as it is a suspension of the juridical order itself, 
it defines law’s threshold or limit concept.”24 In other words, state 
of exception is not the existing law itself, but a vertical expansion 
from it, giving it another dimension. Instead of creating an entirely 
new law aside from the existing, it is like creating a new category 
within it that has power to overrule the existing whenever necessary. 
Essentially, undoing of the existing law creates a new condition that 
will satisfy the exception. Agamben explains the structure of state of 
exception by borrowing the words from Saint-Bonnet and Fontana as 
follows:
The word “faction” is a combina-
tion of “fact” and “fiction.” In film 
or literature, the term describes 
a piece of work comprising a 
dramatized presentation of real 
life events or characters. 
Throughout his essay, Agamben 
discusses in detail, the neccessi-
ties and the negative effects of 
state of exception. He especially 
emphasizes on the essentiality of 
absolute necessity and temporari-
ness, and how there are no limits 
to state of exception. This thesis 
uses these elements as a descrip-





…the state of exception constitutes a “point of im-
balance between public law and political fact”(Saint-
Bonnet 2001, 28) that is situated- like civil war, insur-
rection and resistance, in an “ambiguous, uncertain, 
borderline fringe, at the intersection of the legal and 
the political” (Fontana 1999, 16).25
This point of imbalance situated in a “borderline fringe,” in this 
case, the DMZ, is required to create a state of exception within 
the common grounds of North and South Korea. The imbalance 
can be any difference between the two countries, whether it be 
political tension, military tactics, or economic disparity. Where do 
these points of imbalance exist? The points of imbalance tend to 
exist near the border, as the two Koreas are a “divided” nation. 
The infiltration tunnels dug by the North are examples of military 
imbalance; the DMZ, on land, and the Northern Limit Line (NLL), 
a maritime border on the Yellow Sea, are examples of not only 
military, but also political and physical imbalance between the two 
Koreas. These imbalances are the results of the conflict between 
the two countries; however, some imbalances have also sprung 
from mutual agreements. The fundamental idea of Agamben’s 
state of exception is that it refers more directly to the state of 
emergency occurring at a threat to governmental or political 
status; this state of emergency undoes the law to temporarily 
solve the problem. However, these imbalances, under a mutual 
agreement between the two Koreas, take the basic theory and 
change the term “threat” into “economic benefit.” Moving slightly 
away from the law or policy, these imbalances focus more on 
spatial and social terms with relevance to North and South Korea. 
They physically exist as faction spaces in two areas of North Korea: 
Gaeseong Industrial Complex and Mount Geumgang Tourist Region. 
 
In the case of North and South Korea, these two faction spaces 
did not emerge from the state of emergency; rather, it was solely 
based on calculations of economic benefits for both countries. 
The necessity of economic growth made these two countries 
shake hands over the barbed wire fences. The possibility and the 
opportunity to strengthen their economy were greater than the fact 
that they are in a state of armistice. On top of the calculations, 
people’s desires played a great factor in driving these faction 
spaces forward: the North Koreans’ desires to work in a better 
environment and earn more money, and the South Koreans’ desires 
to use cheap labour or visit Mount Geumgang. Further discussions 
on these examples will be made in the next chapter.
Agamben, 1. 25
















































Spatial products of tourism are designed to freely conquer 
territory that is unencumbered by the inconveniences of poli-
tics. Yet the same fantasies and fictions they deploy possess 





[ fact vs. fiction ]
As referred previously, two faction spaces already exist as 
an agreement between North and South Korea. Both of these 
faction spaces are physically located in North Korea, but were 
planned and developed by South Korea. They are both unique 
worlds within themselves, constituting neither of North or South 
Korean laws, but of its own. People live, work, and visit these 
places— the place is real. Yet, the spaces are designed to 
illustrate certain stories, not like any other in North or South 
Korea. A script is written and strictly followed; then, is one really 
experiencing the real aspects of the space or the fairy tale-




Gaeseong Industrial Complex is located in North Korea, only 
50km away from central Seoul. Its agreement first signed on Au-
gust of year 2000, Gaeseong Industrial Complex is a joint project 
between the North and South Korea in pursuing economic 
development for both countries. Although located in the north, 
the complex houses only South Korean companies, whereas the 
workers are all North Koreans (except for South Korean manag-
ers). Since its official opening in December 2004, the complex 
has grown exponentially. In total, there are 123 companies, 
which are mainly simple goods factories such as textiles and 
machinery metals, and 48,206 North Korean workers and 722 
South Korean managers are dispersed amongst these compa-
nies.26 The average salary of North Korean labourers is approxi-
mately one hundred and sixty US dollars per month, the highest 
in North Korea, but still quarter the salary paid to labourers in 
China.27 This way, North Koreans receive fairly high wages, and 
More detailed statistics are avail-
able at the official website of 
Gaeseong Industrial Complex. 
(www.kidmac.com)





fig. 2.1 The Gaeseong Industrial Complex, North Korea
29 the faction
South Korean companies spend less on labour costs than those 
in China. For ordinary North Koreans, being selected to work 
at the complex is also the best possible job in the country. Not 
only the wage attracts people, but also the working conditions 
at the factories in the complex. Most of these factories are 
either at the same or better working conditions than those in 
South Korea; each factory has showers, change rooms, rest 
areas, restaurant/cafeteria, and even a paramedic. The work 
environment is much better because the law requires a suffi-
cient amount of natural daylight and adequate air quality.28 For 
the past seven years, collaboration at the complex has been 
positive, and both sides functioning satisfactorily. Recently, 
the practice of offering workers small bonuses has become a 
significant burden. An example of this is seen with the offering 
of ChocoPies29 in addition to workers’ regular wages, as a ges-
ture of encouragement to enhance efficiency. In South Korea 
one ChocoPie would cost about fifty cents, but in the North, 
the price escalates exponentially to almost ten dollars apiece, 
almost one-tenth of an average monthly wage. This inflation is 
a result of the scarcity of South Korean products in the North. 
As a result, black markets began to form dealing in these 
ChocoPies, and the workers began to demand for even more, 
resulting in an awkward position for the companies.30 
 
Gaeseong Industrial Complex is a good example of a faction 
space where North and South Korea meet: owned by South 
Korea, located in North Korea, and staffed by mostly North 
Koreans. The outer appearance resembles any South Korean 
industrial complex, whereas the actual rules applied to the 
workers are North Korea’s. This kind of partnership between 
the two countries was and is still possible because of the 
economic profits that each gains. For the North, Gaeseong 
Industrial Complex is one of their greatest sources of foreign 
currency, whereas for the South, it offers cheap and available 
labour. The conditions of being a faction space are maintained 
through the state of exception caused by a win-win situation 
for both countries.
ChocoPies are chocolate covered 
marshmellow cakes made in South 
Korea. 
Kyunghyang Sinmun, 2011.
More detailed information is 
available at the official website of 






fig. 2.2 View of Gaeseong Industrial Complex
31 the faction
fig. 2.3 North Korean workers inside a typical factory within the Complex
32(de) militarized zone
east sea
fig. 2.4 Mount Geumgang Tourist Region
33 the faction
[ the resort ]
Mount Geumgang Tourist Region is located in North Korea by 
the East Sea, just above the northern DMZ boundary line. It first 
opened its doors to the South Korean tourists in 1998, after years 
of discussion between the North Korean government and Hyundai 
Asan, a sub-company officially established by Hyundai in 1999 to 
deal with projects dedicated to North and South Korean relations. 
The idea for the tours was first introduced by the former CEO of 
Hyundai, Jung Mong Jun, to make it possible for the people, most-
ly Korean elders who moved from North Korea before the war, to 
visit Mount Geumgang.31 In making this agreement reality, Hyundai 
Asan had to fulfil various demands by the North. During the initial 
stage, Kim Jong Il and his top officials requested thirty thousand 
25-inch colour television sets from Hyundai in addition to the 
$942 million that they had to pay North Korea over a period of six 
years for the exclusive rights to development.32 They were also 
responsible for all the costs related to the construction of the 
transportation systems (ports, roads, airports, and railways) and 
the resort buildings, which included hotels, a performance center, 
shops, and restaurants. A cruise ship was the first transportation 
method, then later trains, airplanes, buses, and cars. Considered 
to be one of the best presents for parents because of its meaning 
to the elders, Mount Geumgang tour package sales grew rapidly, 
and correspondingly, the number of tourists increased every year, 
reaching over three hundred thousand in 2007 alone.
 
Mount Geumgang is a faction space where a “drop” of South 
Korean culture is within North Korea, like Gaeseong Industrial 
Complex, except for the fact that the users are only South 
Koreans. By law, only South Koreans were allowed to enter the 
tourist area; the only North Koreans permitted into the area were 
the official tour guides and military soldiers. However, it was 
the North Korean government who set strict policies regarding 
the tourists’ visit to the area. Tourists were not allowed to carry 
cameras with lenses above 24x zoom or focal length of 160mm, 
have any type of mobile communication system (cellphones or 
walkie talkies), bring multiple copies of documents or video-
tapes that were not directly relevant to the tour. They were also 
disallowed from carrying Japanese and American flags.33 Visitors 
were also not allowed to talk to the North Korean tour guides 
about “inappropriate” topics, which included life in South Korea, 
More detailed timeline and in-
formation on Mount Geumgang 




Specific directions on border 
crossing is available at the website 






international news, and negative aspects about the North Korean 
government.34 The tour was successful for ten years without any 
issue until July 2008: a South Korean woman was shot by a North 
Korean soldier at the beach. At the resort, tourists could move 
only within a set boundary in order to prevent anyone going over 
to the “North,” including a vague line at the beach. The woman 
was strolling along the beach at night and she did not realize 
that she had crossed over that line. According to the report by 
North Korea (which cannot be confirmed to be true), the soldier 
gave her three warnings before shooting her.35 This incident put 
a stop to the tours, which have since been cancelled indefinitely. 
Faction space was no longer maintained; the laws within this state 
of exception could not be maintained against the pressures of the 
world outside the resort.
Statement written by a witness of 
the scene is available in Korean at:





fig. 2.5 Tourist Map of Mount Geumgang Tourist Region
36(de) militarized zone
[ the fiction ]
 
From the previous examples of faction spaces, I would like to 
show how the fiction is overlaid on top of the fact. To create 
faction spaces, the spaces first have to be restated in terms of 
topics in order to actually write the stories. Gaeseong Industrial 
Complex would be categorized under economics and production; 
Mount Geumgang Tourist Region would be tourism (leisure) and 
economics; and both examples have a base layer of politics.
 
Although she does not exactly use the term “faction space,” 
Keller Easterling36 discusses Mount Geumgang in terms of fictional 
space. In her essay “DPRK”, she states:
Fiction, the cheerful friend of politics and tourism, gener-
ates symbolic capital not because the comedy of its fake 
crests, seals, and epaulets actually means something, but 
precisely because there is a tacit agreement that it means 
nothing.37
According to Easterling, “fiction” is a powerful tool in creating 
or erasing the meaning behind what exists in reality; in the case 
of her example of the Mount Geumgang Tourist Resort, they are 
politics and tourism. This idea leads to the question, “what is the 
story that means nothing but means everything?” This story does 
not need any factual significance; rather, it has to touch people’s 
emotions and memories in order to manipulate them to think that 
the space actually has significance in their lives. In the case of 
Mount Geumgang, the sensual meaning of the mountain (which is 
equivalent to Mount Fuji of Japan) and the opportunity to visit it 
in person were the main derivatives of the story.
 
Yet the phenomenon of the Mount Kumgang tour may have 
less to do with neoliberal naturalizing of the spectacle and 
more to do with compatibility, even attraction, between 
fictions, delusions, and fetishes in the fairy tales of both 
communism and capitalism– fairy tales in which tourism and 
landscape are active solvents.38
North and South Korea chose “connection,” “longing,” “reunion,” 
Easterling, 26.
Keller Easterling is an American 
architect, urbanist, writer, and a 
professor who focuses on the is-







and “hope” as the themes for the fiction to be written over the 
fact about the “beautiful” nature and space of Mount Geumgang. 
These themes were able to offer an experience that stimulated 
the tourists’ emotions without any connections to politics because 
these words had no meaning or power from a political viewpoint. 
The stories targeted specifically the elders, the majority of the 
tourists, who moved from North Korea to South Korea before the 
war. To them, it was a “dream come true” the moment they set 
their feet on the cruise ship. Nevertheless, North Korea wrote the 
majority of this fiction under a strict set of rules and boundaries; 
they had to keep the “real” North Korea hidden from the South 
Korean visitors.
…only do tourism and totalitarianism utilize the same tools 
of mental vacuity, they become each other’s next masquer-
ade. The fact that both masquerades require the obfus-
cation of meaning is not a tragedy of meaninglessness. 
Rather, this meaninglessness is the meaning as well as the 
opportunity for political leverage.39
Creation of this faction space based on the concepts of states 
of exception profited both countries economically and politi-
cally; the people were thankful to both governments for making 
this tour possible. As a result, both sides were willing to leverage 
their political stance, the armistice state, for capital development. 
Nevertheless, no one can conclude whether this type of faction 
space will last or diminish; it may become too weird to exist any 




Theories discussed in previous examples can be used to begin 
setting up the storyboard of the faction space that responds to 
the potential development occurring between the two Koreas. 
General limitations and conditions of both countries regarding 
political, economic, and social activities should be noted again in 
order to translate these into spatial limitations.
 
Overall, North Korea has much more restrictive laws than South 
Korea. Under the dictatorship of the Kim family, North Koreans 
have limitations in every aspect of their lives, including private 
ownership, social activities, and individual rights. From kin-
dergarten, children begin to join the Youth League that fulfills 
social education outside of regular school hours; these leagues 
(later, Unions for adults) enforce “manifestations of collective 
activities” and the idea of Juche.40
Pyongyang is a theater, a Potemkin village, and as many 
as a thousand people may be called upon to play shoppers 
and pedestrians when Kim Jong Il stages urbanism for 
visiting dignitaries.41
On a guided tour of the city, we encountered several 
hundred fourth-grade boys, led by an adult instructor, 
doing mass exercises with wooden swords or, lacking 
these, pieces of flat wood cut to the length of swords. 
The boys slashed, jumped, and shouted with enthusiasm 
and on cue. This was only one of many manifestations 
of the collective activities that were being emphasized. 
People on the streets avoided glancing at us when we 
approached, and the children in a model school did not 
even look up from work when their headmaster, two 
strange Westerners, and guides invaded their classroom—
evidently because they had been instructed to take no 
notice. I found this chilling and dehumanizing.42
Juche refers to the political thesis 
of Kim Il Sung. The word itself 
means “independent stand” or 







fig. 2.6 Pyongyang, North Korea
A view of Pyongyang streets, with a glimpse of the Ryugyong Hotel, a 1,083-foot tall skyscraper that 
was abandoned in mid-construction in 1992. (center, pyramid-shaped building in the distance.) 
As portrayed in the text above, life in North Korea is much more 
structured and organized under a strict set of laws than what 
has been depicted through the two previous examples of fac-
tion space. What an international audience saw and heard can be 
assumed that they have been staged and carefully planned by the 
North Korean government. Nobody really knows about the actual 
living conditions and limitations faced by the North Korean people 
in general. On the other hand, South Korea is extremely open in 
all aspects related to the individual’s rights, whether choice of 
religion, freedom of speech, or the “right to know.” What is seen 
and heard on the streets of South Korea are not a master plan 
by the government, but a result of the individual’s own will and 
actions. These limitations, regulations, or freedom can be used to 
design spatial parameters of the faction spaces.
40(de) militarized zone
[the marginality]
If North Korea is a perfectly knotted string, South Korea is more 
like a freely tangled string. What would happen if someone tied a 
knot inside the tangled string or vice versa? A positive outcome 
might be that it allows for variations or opportunities for inno-
vative findings; new type of spaces might emerge out from the 
mixture. However, if the implementations are not planned out 
thoroughly enough, negative outcomes may arise. As discussed 
before in the previous chapter, the state of exception created by 
the 9/11 incident was an outcome of state of emergency; security 
enforcements were applied excessively to the extent that some 
individuals began to feel offended.
 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, faction space is created from 
the policies and limitations set by the conditions of the state of 
exception. This process can be translated into a spatial con-
cept. In his essay “Of Other Spaces: Utopias and Heterotopias”, 
Michel Foucault discusses the presence of heterotopia as “a sort 
of place that lies outside all places and yet is actually localiz-
able”43; it is the marginally occupying space that works within 
the greater whole. This idea can be applied to the previously 
discussed examples, where the sites have their own set of stories 
and are surrounded by an area with clearly different qualities than 
themselves.
On the one hand they perform the task of creating a 
space of illusion that reveals how all of real space is 
more illusory, all the locations within life is fragmented. 
On the other, they have the function of forming another 
space, another real space, as perfect, meticulous, and 
well-arranged as ours is disordered, ill-conceived, and in a 
sketchy state.44
As Foucault states, this type of space has two-sides: the space 
created by the story which was written because of the fact that 
the space is different from its surroundings, and how the space 
functions in real life just like any other space. This is possible by 






…spatial practices as “space perceived (percu) in a com-
monsensical mode”; the representations of space as “dis-
courses on space” or “the discursive regimes of analysis, 
spatial and planning professions and expert knowledges 
that conceive of space (l’espace concu)”; and, finally, the 
spaces of representation as “discourses of space,” “space 
as it might be, fully lived space (l’espace vecu)”: the 
spaces of representation form the social imaginary45
When one takes into account how a person perceives, conceives, 
and imagines a space when writing the fiction over the space, 
they are drawing out the connection between the person’s emo-
tions and how they experience the space. This shows clearly in 
the example of Mount Geumgang Tourist Region, where the entire 
resort was covered in stories to connect personally with every 
tourist’s emotions. To the tourists, the reality of issues of politics 
and economics do not matter when the stories themselves actu-
ally are the final outcome of these issues.
Spatial products of tourism are designed to freely conquer 
territory that is unencumbered by the inconveniences of 
politics. Yet the same fantasies and fictions they deploy 
possess an ancient political instrumentality.46
In the following proposal, this method is applied in creating 
another faction space, this time, across the borderline of the 
DMZ. The fiction is written according to the facts of the site, the 










{ }...the borderline landscape interventions perform as remedial architectural stimulus within the feuding landscape...
44(de) militarized zone
[the thesis]
Since 1945, North and South Korea have been in a constant 
state of war, in political, economic, social, and even, at times, 
in physical terms. As one of the only few divided nations in the 
world, the two Koreas face various challenges with each other 
as well as with the rest of the world. The complexity of the 
relationship makes it difficult to speculate on the future of the 
one nation in two countries. Over the past sixty years, North 
and South Korea have played a game of tug-of-war, from dig-
ging infiltration tunnels and building dams to sending food aid 
and setting up reunions for separated families. Usually, the 
negative aspects were permanent, whereas the positive ones 
were temporary. Nevertheless, there have been times when the 
two countries worked together to create something beyond the 
norm; the examples of the cooperation are the Mt.Geumgang 
Tourist Resort and the Gaeseong Industrial Complex. These 
two areas have been created as faction spaces because of the 
economic benefits to both countries by constituting a state of 
exception; the two Koreas are not at peace, but at armistice 
state. These faction spaces are very fragile because the their 
foundation in politics and the economy fluctuates depending on 
the governments’ internal conditions and relations with other 
nations. Mt.Geumgang Tourist Resort is a good example of this 
fragility; the resort closed after ten years of operation due to a 
shooting incident on its the resort grounds, where North Korean 
soldiers killed a South Korean tourist for crossing a boundary on 
the beach.
 
These faction spaces were transformed from policy agreements 
into physical reality. A fictional story was written over the fac-
tual reality of the space, in order to justify and make sense out 
of the existence of conditions outside the norm. Faction allows 
the site to transform into a totally different space perceived 
by the users; people are connected to the space experientially 
rather than being filtered by political agenda. The faction space 
becomes a world of its own within the greater whole— essen-
tially, it becomes a heterotopia with an ironic twist. 
45 the field
 
The current relationship between North and South Korea is not 
at its best. After the many years of ups and downs, it is slowly 
going into a downfall, especially after the change in regime. 
It seems to be a time that North and South Korea begin to 
find new ways to work with each other to create more mutu-
ally beneficial relationships, rather than threatening ones. Fully 
accepting the reality of the armistice state between North and 
South Korea, this thesis proposes a relationship not through the 
physical presence of both North and South Korean people in one 
place, but through the faction spaces that each side creates and 
inhabits. This proposal points to a way to overcome the imbal-
ance between the two Koreas by establishing a new “faction” 
within the DMZ, rather than trying to establish a permanent 
condition between each other. The new faction is written under 
the condition of sharing the common necessity of both coun-
tries: water. Both North and South Korea face problems with 
water throughout the year; South Korea is categorized as the 
country that will have the highest water stress level by 2050.47  
North Korea faces shortage of water every year, let alone of 
basic food necessities. Soon, North and South Korea will need 
to develop a more efficient system of managing their water 
resources. This thesis attempts to create this system by allocat-
ing faction spaces along the DMZ landscape, establishing a new 




Water is one of the basic necessities of the human race. 
Approximately 1.2 billion people around the world live in areas 
with a “physical” scarcity of water, and 500 million people more 
will soon face this problem; another 1.6 billion people face 
“economic” water shortage.48 According to “OECD Environmental 
Outlook to 2050,” South Korea faces the highest water stress by 
using more than 40% of the country’s total average water yield.49 
South Korea’s mean annual precipitation is 1,283mm, which is 
higher than the world average of 973mm; however, after factor-
ing in the population, the average drops to 2,705m3 per capita, 
which is significantly less than the world average of 26,800m3.50  
In addition, two-thirds of the annual precipitation falls from June 
to September, leading to severe flooding in the summer and 
droughts in the spring and winter. Although no specific data are 
available for North Korea, the average freshwater withdrawal is 
only 401m3 per capita, and the country experiences droughts in 
late spring, followed by severe flooding during the summer. It is 
essential that better water management systems be developed for 
the sake of both countries’ futures.
 
This “water” becomes the basis of creating the new faction space 
that connects both North and South Korea. Unlike the existing 
examples, this new faction space can become more grounded 
and permanent because it focuses on a common necessity rather 
than a desired economic result. The relationship between the 
two Koreas no longer depends on political or economic benefits, 
but on the basic necessity of life: water.  The proposed faction 
spaces are located across the length of the river that flows down 
from Imnam Dam of North Korea, passing through the DMZ, until 
the Peace Dam of South Korea. The history of these dams and the 
past tensions are the groundwork for the new faction. The fiction 
written for the space transforms the current definite boundary 
into a trans-territorial condition; it creates a relationship through 
this mutual element – water – on both sides and either intensi-











All are places where shortages of water contribute to 
poverty. They cause social hardship and impede develop-
ment. They create tensions in conflict-prone regions. Too 
often, where we need water we find guns. […] There is 
still enough water for all of us – but only so long as we 
keep it clean, use it more wisely, and share it fairly.
Ban Ki-moon, UN Secretary General
48(de) militarized zone
[ the site ]
The site of the proposal is the 34km strip of the Bukhan River 
and the surrounding pocket spaces located between the Imnam 
Dam of North Korea and the Peace Dam of South Korea, inclu-
sive of the DMZ in between. Covering approximately 5.1km2 of 
surface area, the mean depth of the water is only approximate-
ly 1–2 meters. Initially, the conflict may have started with the 
threat of severe flooding, but in reality, it is leaning towards 




fig. 3.1 site location 
DMZ area between Mt.Geumgang Dam in North Korea and Peace Dam in South Korea 






















fig. 3.2 greater context
Location of major dams along the course of the water from Imnam Dam, North Korea to 
Seoul, South Korea. The grey dots are the locations of guard posts: dark grey for North 
Korea, and light grey for South Korea. 
52(de) militarized zone





fig. 3.4 after dams in 2012
Imnam Dam, North Korea
1986-2003




















fig. 3.5 potential flooding
Potential bombing of Imnam Dam
: overflow of water 
Rise of water level
: fills up pocket spaces
Slight overflow over Peace Dam
: overflow amount equivalent to
  preoccupied volume of water 
  between the two dams
Rise of water level at Lake Paro
: possibility of overflow at 
  Hwacheon Dam
55 the field
Proposal of a series of developments 
relative to local and overall area
: most programs are supported by  
  the Bukhan River
: programs allocated to fit into 





development of water control with secondary programs
56(de) militarized zone
[the fiction : program]
Through four major programs consisting of Agriculture, Military, 
Ecology, and Tourism, the proposal focuses on creating faction 
spaces along the site to create a series of predictable, but also 
unexpected spaces. By introducing various visual and tactile 
public and military interactions, such as wetland exploration, 
productive farming and fishing, military training, and sightseeing, 
the borderline landscape perform as an unusual spatial stimulus 
within the feuding landscape. In order to transfer the different 
types of faction spaces from one country to the other effective-
ly, these stimuli are proposed with similar architectural language, 
inspired by elements existing on site. As a result, the DMZ border 
is atomized into smaller worlds of their own, forming a borderline 
with various stories rather than one. This ideological connection 
of programs launches new borderline conditions that establish 
mutually beneficial relationship between the two Koreas.
“… both sides pretend to be what the other wants just long 
enough to make the deal.”51
The two Koreas pretend to care for each other; but in reality, 
all moves are calculated strictly based on economic and military 
advancement of its own country. In reaction to this reality, the 
economic benefits is the base layer of the whole faction; above 
these, the topics of agriculture, military, ecology, and tour-
ism cover them up to make the story richer and more favour-
able. The site is divided into four different zones according to 
the different conditions of the site. The programs of each zone 
determine the relationship between North and South Korea. Zone 
A is located in North Korea, and it focuses on agricultural pro-
duction; this zone has contributions from both North and South 
Korea. Zone B is located on the Northern borderline of the DMZ, 
and it focuses on military productivity; this zone is maintained 
solely by North Korea. Zone C is located on the Southern border-
line of the DMZ, and it focuses on ecological research; this zone 
functions under the collaboration of both North and South Korea. 
Zone D is located in South Korea, and it focuses on dynamic 
tourism; this zone is developed by South Korea. These zones 
are ultimately faction spaces that lead to an alternate way of 
structuring the borderline; instead of revealing the tension and 
mistrust between each other fully, North and South Korea utilize 









fig. 3.7 site division
The site is divided into four zones accord-
ing to the different conditions of the site. 
These zones are located in North Korea, 
borderline of North Korea-DMZ, borderline 






observation post military training field
villages
farmland water storage
fish farm / fishing pond pool wetland
fig. 3.8 existing infrastuctures
There are six infrastructures interacting 
directly with the water and the surrounding 
landscape at the site. These were made strictly 






observation post military training field
villages
farmland water storage
fish farm / fishing pond pool wetland
fig. 3.9 proposed infrastructures
The proposal contains an addition of six new 
infrastructures on the site. These are to be 
applied according to the program of the zone, 
not of location (whether they are in North or 
South Korea.) 
60(de) militarized zone
Zone A: North Korea [ Agricultural Production ]
Located just south of the Imnam Dam of North Korea, this zone 
focuses on agricultural production. The main objective of this 
zone is to activate the public engagement with the landscape 
by utilizing all types of landscape for agriculture. The Inman 
Dam is one of the major facts of this zone; when used, it has 
the capabilities to generate hydroelectric power to support the 
nearby villages. Releasing the water from this dam is cru-
cial for this proposal; water is needed. Once the dam begins 
to release the waters at regular rate, the river’s water level 
rises, and as a result, the aquaculture and ecology of the river 
becomes more diverse over time. The existing villages and the 
farmlands are the other facts of this zone; the villages have 
developed within the valleys and the farmlands on the plateaus 
by the river edges. As one of the typical rural areas of North 
Korea, a form of collective residential area (all the same type 
of housing) is observed, but no permanent military presence 
above ground (military bunker or barracks) is observed al-
though the area is very proximate to the DMZ border.52
 
Taking advantage of the existing villages and farmlands, the 
faction space focuses on developing the area into an extensive 
production district through farming and fishing. South Korea 
can help by investing in constructing the farms, orchards, 
and fisheries;53 in addition, the South Korean farmers will be 
able to share their knowledge and skills to the North Korean 
farmers as a gesture of exchange for the amount of water sent 
down the river from the North.54 In North Korea, approximately 
36.8% of the total labour force are agricultural workers.55 
The City of Jaecheon created ap-
ple and peach orchards (10,000m2 
and 23,000m2) near the Mount 
Geumgang Tourist Resort back 
in 2004. The city and the farmers 
supported the orchards with seed-
lings, soil conditioner, and farm 
machineries. 
-Min, Woongki, Yeonhap News.
South Korea faces extreme 
drought at times because of the 
shortage of water.  After Imnam 
Dam, the volume of water South 
Korea received from the North 
decreased by approximately 3.5 
billion m3/ year.
Calculated based on the numbers 
from The World Factbook.
Speculated by the author through 







Under the assumption that North 
Korea follows the system exactly 
as South Korea, it can be specu-
lated that their GDP in agriculture 
will increase as much as South 
Korea. The rate is speculated 
based on the numbers from The 
World Factbook.
56
Among them, many face shortage of production due to the lack 
of productive environment, such as technological skills and 
knowledge, for farming. This zone can provide opportunities 
for agricultural growth in North Korea. More farmers can move 
in to support the needs, and the North Korean military can be 
involved for management and security. This faction space il-
lustrates the ironic situation similar to the Gaeseong Industrial 
Complex, except this time, South Korea invests not for direct 
profits from the produce of the area, but for the water. This 
concept of trade for benefits is the strongest driving force for 
this faction space. Preliminary design elements are proposed 
to show how the space may function under this main concept. 
The farming and fishing systems are designed to minimize 
negative impact on the water. For example, the river is used 
as the main water source for the farm, and any discharge after 
use is directed into the wetlands for purification before being 
released back into the river. The produce is marketed with 
higher value for being ecologically cultivated; this means high-
er profit for the North In addition, the additional hydroelectric 
bridge generates extra power required to process the goods. 
The farmlands and orchards may extend further on the nearby 
valleys and hilltops in terraced landscapes for additional profit 
opportunities. All of these systems are to be developed with 
the help from South Korea; essentially, South Korea is helping 
North Korea grow. Under this system, North Korea will be able 
to slowly increase their productivity up to four times greater, 
given that their agricultural industry levels with South Korea.56
 
This zone is like an agricultural version of the faction of 
Gaeseong Industrial Complex. The economic benefits resulting 
from this zone may allow the physical tension to ease along 
the entire site and form a tighter relationship with South Ko-
rea. North Korea is earning direct profit from the system that 
South Korea has developed for them in return for the water. 
Nevertheless, the mistrust resulting from the sixty year separa-
tion of the two countries may be hard to reverse, but can be 
confronted by expanding the on-going economic relationship, 
enabling a building of familiarity and trust. This zone is benefi-
cial to both North and South Korea.
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fig. 3.12 zone a : North Korea
fig. 3.14 zone a masterplan
Zone A is developed with focus on creating 
an agricultural production zone around the 
Imnam Dam area. Every possible piece of 
land is used to cultivate produce for the 
North Koreans; all work is observed and 
























fig. 3.15 zone b partial plan




fig. 3.16 view into zone a
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fig. 3.17 view of farmlands and orchard
70(de) militarized zone
Zone B: North Korea – DMZ [ Military Grounds ]
Located right on the Northern borderline of the DMZ, this 
zone focuses on developing military grounds for North Korea. 
The main objective of this zone is to raise the North Korean 
soldiers’ morale. The facts of this zone are comprised of the 
above ground fence along the DMZ boundary, the military 
guard posts and barracks, and the nearby farmlands and villag-
es. Among these lies an interesting fact: the farmlands are not 
only for the public, but also for the military as well. In North 
Korea, the soldiers also have a duty to farm their own produce, 
or at least be part of the community farming practice.57 Now 
that each military unit has to find ways to sustain themselves 
regarding food after the abolition of the distribution system to 
the soldiers, the needs for self-farming has increased. In North 
Korea, approximately 41% of the total population is fit for mili-
tary service, and is estimated that approximately 1.16 million 
of them are active soldiers.58 This means that 1.16 million more 
people are facing food shortage problems.
Speculated by the author based on 
aerial photography which reveals 
that next to each military installa-
tion, there are farm fields regard-
less of whether there is any nearby 
civilian population.
The World Factbook.
Lee, Seok. “What is the real num-





Only 4km apart by straight-line 




Taking in the fact that the soldiers have to self-sustain, this 
faction space is written to dedicate the entire area solely for 
a self-sustainable military village. Unlike Zone A, this zone is 
built and maintained solely by North Korea because to South 
Korea, contributing to develop a military village has no benefits 
to them in any way. For development, the northern area where 
public farmlands are now is transformed into military train-
ing fields and barracks, creating a community of soldiers. The 
military uses the existing landscape at maximum efficiency for 
their training; the area even extends into the river for underwa-
ter training to prepare and prevent for any underwater attacks 
from South Korea and defections to the South by the North 
Koreans. This is a great area for military training because the 
soldiers are exposed to the various landscape conditions of the 
borderline; they are gaining an advantage of being familiar with 
the region. The farmlands on the southern area are kept for 
military farming, and then, dedicated fishing areas are added 
on the river to expand the types of food source available for 
the military. Based on their needs, more food can be produced 
in Zone A; this also creates opportunities for north-south 
expansion between the two zones. Same as the system in zone 
A, the river is used as the water source for the farm, and the 
discharge after use is directed into the wetland for purifica-
tion before being released into the river. An infrastructure that 
generates hydroelectric power is constructed on the edge to 
support the needs of the military village.
 
If zone A carries an opportunity of easing the tension, this zone 
intently exposes the tension. For the North, it may become a 
prototype for a smaller scale military base located at borderline 
conditions; the presence of the base itself becomes a threat 
and a symbol of power to the opponent. This faction space is 
the most risk taking out of the four spaces. By unexpectedly 
locating a full military base right on the borderline, North Korea 
is being vulnerable to the potentials of being attacked by South 
Korea; the distance is close enough for South Korea to perform 
a sudden attack.59 However, they are taking the risk to train 
their soldiers to fully adopt the DMZ landscape for better ef-
ficiency in case of physical war. This zone is beneficial to only 
North Korea. 
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fig. 3.22 zone b masterplan
Zone B is developed with focus on the 
North Korean military. A self-sustainable 
military village is designed on the border-
line for maximum efficiency.
military farmlands
military training field
fig. 3.21 site landscape
























fig. 3.23 zone b partial plan




fig. 3.24 view into zone b
78(de) militarized zone
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fig. 3.25 view of military training field
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Zone C: DMZ – South Korea [ Extensive Research ]
Located right on the Southern borderline of the DMZ, this zone 
focuses on facilitating extensive research about the DMZ ecol-
ogy. The main objective of this zone is to study the ecological 
value and quality of the DMZ and the Bukhan River, and find 
ways to enrich and maintain the biodiversity of the area. There 
already have been establishments of research groups, such as 
The DMZ Forum60, to promote and support the conservation of 
the unique ecological and cultural conditions of the DMZ. Simi-
lar to zone B, the existing facts of this zone are mostly military 
related. There are gated military guard posts on the highest 
points of the mountains, an above ground fence along the 
South Korean DMZ borderline, a military bridge, and underwa-
ter screens below the bridge and also a separate screen fence 
just north of the bridge. Currently, there is absolutely no pub-
lic access to this zone; ecology researchers or reporters are 
sometimes permitted only when accompanied by the soldiers.
 
Although the facts are almost identical to zone B, the resulting 
faction for this zone is written differently. In Zone B’s faction, 
North Korea emphasizes on military power, but in this fac-
The DMZ Forum is an international 
NGO, in support of the conserva-





Kim, Ji-seung. “DMZ not recog-
nized as a biosphere reserve.” 
The Hankyoreh. 
More detailed information 





tion, South Korea puts greater interests and weight on gaining 
knowledge about the ecology of the DMZ and how to sustain 
it. Many researchers around the world, as well as the general 
public of South Korea, are interested in the effects and the 
system of the “sixty-years untouched” nature inside the barbed 
wire fence line. The South Korean government applied for 
the southern part of the DMZ to be designated as a UNESCO 
Biosphere Reserve in September 2011, but it was turned down 
recently in July 2012. One of the main reasons was that it did 
not have a clearly identified buffer zone: North Korea.61 In 
response to this situation, South Korea takes a bold move to 
push stronger towards the development of private research fa-
cilities inside the southern DMZ boundary, inviting researchers 
from around the world, including North Korea, to collaborate in 
promoting the biodiversity of the DMZ as well as the symbolic 
meaning of peace between the two countries. The research 
specifically focuses on studying the overall ecology and animal 
life of the DMZ, including water quality, animal, fish, and plant 
species. Currently, there are 2,900 plant species, 70 types of 
mammals, and 320 kinds of birds, of which include rare species 
such as Red-crowned Crane, Korean Tiger, and Amur Leopard, 
in the DMZ.62 Most species are specific to the ecosystem of Ko-
rea, and sustaining them would be crucial to the future of both 
Korea’s nature. In addition to the research facilities, there are 
water storages located proximately to not only record precipi-
tation levels and water quality of the DMZ, but also to provide 
freshwater for the nearby military guard posts and to control 
flooding during the heavy rainfall season in the summer. The 
hydroelectric bridge acts as a circulation method for the re-
searchers to keep them separate from the military, as well as a 
power source for the facility.
 
This faction space goes beyond the norm of questioning just 
the adjacent countries of the borderline; it works to solve 
questions for the greater whole. Although studying nature may 
not seem helpful to either of the Koreas at the moment, it 
opens up opportunities for the two to connect with each other 
through the common denominator of nature. It also leads to 
greater chances of the DMZ receiving designation by UNESCO 
as a Heritage Site, resulting a more positive reputation to the 
international crowd as well. This zone is beneficial to both 
North and South Korea. 
82(de) militarized zone
fig. 3.26 existing on site
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fig. 3.27 addition on site



















fig. 3.30 zone c masterplan
Zone C is developed with focus on the re-
search of the DMZ ecology. The research 
facilities are located “inside” the DMZ 
in order to get hands-on access to the 
resources. 
fig. 3.29 site landscape





























fig. 3.31 zone c partial plan




fig. 3.32 view into zone c
88(de) militarized zone
89 the field
fig. 3.33 view from water storage area
90(de) militarized zone
Zone D: South Korea [ Dynamic Tourism ]
Located upstream of the Peace Dam of South Korea, this zone 
focuses on activating the tourism aspect of the area. The 
main objective of this zone is to immerse the existing tour-
ists into the landscape, specifically, the river. The Peace Dam 
is the predominant fact of this area; as a responsive dam to 
the Imnam Dam of North Korea, this dam does not have any 
other function than flood control. It has been built to simply 
hold back any excessive water volume, such as in case of the 
potential Imnam Dam bombing. As a result, there currently is 
a floodgate on the north side of the dam that leads the water 
towards Hwacheon Dam for drainage. Around the dam are 
various public programs, such as the Peace Square, Bell Park, 
camping grounds and Water Centre;63  they are connected from 
the top of the dam through a pathway that cuts diagonally 
through the south surface of the dam. In this zone, there is no 
residential area close by; the Peace Dam functions purely as a 
destination tourist point.
 
In this faction, the northern area of the dam is developed to 
intensify the existing tourism element of the zone. More area is 
dedicated for camping grounds and additional programs, such 
as public pools, leisure sports on water, and fishing circles, 
are distributed along the river to attract more people to stay 
longer. Recently, the number of visitors increased every year, 
from 188,550 people in 2008 to 248,964 people in 2010. With the 
increase in camping area and programs, it can be speculated 
that the number of visitors will increase at a rate of at least 
20-30%.64 In correlation with the research facilities in Zone C, 
More information available at the 
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a public research and education branch is located in this zone 
to promote the ecological value of the DMZ for visitors; the 
branch also manages the fish farms to maintain the diversity of 
the species. This branch will also be the grounds for the col-
laborative research group from Zone C, allowing the interna-
tional researchers, including North Korea, to interact with the 
public visitors. This is similar to how the Mt.Geumgang Tourist 
Resourt functioned, except this time, it is located in the South. 
The North Korean researchers will be free to talk only about 
their field of study, and not about anything related to their 
lives back home in North Korea. 
 
The overall programs of this zone promote the benefit to the 
society of the Bukhan River and the meaning of the Peace 
Dam. From the four zones, this zone may be the one that 
focuses mostly on the reconciliation of the two Koreas through 
the mutual importance of water to the two nations and the 
potential of peace, arising from greater cooperation and 
familiarity. Nevertheless, one can also perceive this situation 
differently. South Korea is emphasizing the tourism of this 
zone, resulting in great potentials of increased profit, although 
it is only a small fraction of the GDP. Essentially, South Korea 
is benefiting from the outcome of a tragic history. If the tragic 
history does not lead to a tragic future, would South Korea re-
ally want reunification, especially at times when their economy 
is growing? If North and South Korea are to reunite, economic 
depression is not avoidable, as was seen in Germany. 
Many unification movements already exist in South Korea and 
while this may not be the tipping point to major changes in the 
political dialogue between the two nations, it aims at contrib-
uting to the dialogue, positively or negatively. The purpose of 
this zone is to literally and figuratively immerse southerners 
into the waters from North Korea, educate them about where 
they are, and make them think about the relationship be-
tween the two Koreas through experiencing the landscape and 
learning from the researchers directly. Opportunities rise for 
thoughts to change into actions. This zone is beneficial mostly 
to South Korea.
92(de) militarized zone
fig. 3.34 existing on site
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fig. 3.38 zone d masterplan
Zone D is developed with focus tourism. 
The public programs are integrated into 














fig. 3.37 site landscape


























fig. 3.39 zone d partial plan




fig. 3.40 view into zone d
98(de) militarized zone
99 the field
fig. 3.41 view of camping grounds and river programs
100(de) militarized zone
[ conclusion ] 
A problem exists between North and South Korea, and that 
problem cannot be solved instantly. Over the years, many have 
tried to solve it, of which some seemed to work and some 
failed tremendously. The problem, armistice state, requires 
years of planning and careful construction in order for the 
solution to even begin to take place. This thesis proposes 
that solution to be mutual benefits in forms of faction spaces 
rather than the one word, reunification. Faction spaces are not 
something that people encounter throughout their everyday 
lives; it is a place where it has been carefully scripted for its 
uses and how the users perceive it. As such, faction spaces 
become a powerful tool of achieving economic and cultural 
alliance between North and South Korea by establishing a 
relationship other than “two countries at armistice state.” 
Exchange of resources and people has been made through 
the faction spaces. It is not about trying to reunify the two 
Koreas together, but rather, help them coexist as independent 
countries with no tied strings. Mt.Geumgang Tourist Resort’s 
existence as faction space for almost ten years and Gaeseong 
Industrial Complex still existing today may be the solution in 
redesigning the relationship between North and South Korea. 
Not necessarily towards reunification, but something more 
positive than the current state can be anticipated. The govern-
ments can essentially become architects, designing spaces with 
specific programs and purposes that are targeted for specific 
users, but always with an ending that is as open and hopeful, 
as it is unpredictable. It is this open ending that makes the 
existence of faction spaces captivating. Faction spaces may 
either diminish back into the previous state, or be absorbed as 
the norm; this change in state is therefore what keeps the con-
tinuing relationship between the two Koreas moving forward. 
If the faction spaces do become absorbed into the norm, and 
as these increase in numbers, they may become the source for 
possibly creating a new kind of borderline condition that con-
ceptually and physically extend beyond the two sets of barbed 
wire fences that currently define the edges of the DMZ. 
101 the field
Smaller fragments of faction spaces come together to create 
a greater faction space, and smaller events come together to 
stimulate an evolving relationship rather than the current static 
and escalating antagonistic relationship. North and South Korea 
exist in different realities and different conditions, but through 
the gradient of faction spaces, it may become possible to move 
toward an evolving and integrated relationship. A time may 
come when the most heavily militarized zone in the world, the 
demilitarized zone of North and South Korea, shifts its focus to 
become a space for reciprocity, a place of relief, a source that 
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